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On 19 March, the Zonghengzhi think-tank and the European-American Association (FABI) co-hosted a lecture on "Strategic Challenges for China and Europe in the Shadow of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict". The speaker is Mr Song Luzheng, a researcher at the Institute of Chinese Studies of Fudan University and a scholar in France. The conference was attended by Mr. Jiang Bo, Director of the European and American Association, Vice-President of the French Association and former Vice-President of Tongji University (who attended the conference online), and Mr. Ulan Gaohua, Director of the European and American Association and former Vice-President of the French Association. The meeting was hosted by Xia Guo Han, founder of the Zonghengzhi think tank.

Published below is a compilation of the text version of Mr. Song Luzheng's speech (representing the position of the guests only).

Topic: Strategic Challenges for China and Europe in the Shadow of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Sub-theme 1: Assessment of the direction of the war between Russia and Ukraine and its impact on Europe

As scholars of international relations, we generally do not make moral or unjust analyses, but only pros and cons. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict was a very unexpected occurrence and an unexpectedly protracted war. Russia has not been able to achieve a quick military solution, nor has the West's economic war been effective. Russia's economic growth has declined, but total GDP has increased rather than decreased, thanks to the exchange rate rise. According to IMF forecasts, the Russian economy will grow by 0.3% in 2023. What a concept! Germany, the EU's top economy, will grow by just 0.1%, so Russia will be three times as big as Germany.

I. How long will the Russia-Ukraine conflict continue? Will it escalate? How likely is it that a nuclear war will break out? What are the possible endings?

1，Duration of the conflict

I personally think that if there are no accidents - what does this accident mean? You know, if there is a change in the leader of one of the parties to the conflict, you know, like Biden, who is in his eighties and falls down a lot - if there is no such change, I think the conflict will last until at least 2024, after the Russian and US elections.

There's an election in Russia next year, and an election in the US. Biden is unlikely to concede in order to win, as he has said before that he will continue to run, and he is unlikely to accept a loss in Ukraine, and if Trump or another Republican candidate wins after 2024, they could move quickly to negotiations.

Here are a few bits of information to share with you: Trump publicly claimed on March 5 that he could end the Russian-Ukrainian war in just 24 hours if he took office - allowing the two sides to negotiate; on March 7, Gallup in the US also released a new poll in which only 12% of Republican voters believe Russia is the US' worst enemy --12% is very, very low, with a whopping 72% seeing China as their biggest enemy. If the Republicans were in power, he would surely do a policy reversal; in the same poll, 53% of Democrats consider Russia to be the number one threat and only 30% consider China to be the number one threat. Now Republican Speaker McCarthy has also categorically rejected Zelenski's invitation to visit and has repeatedly claimed that he will not write a blank cheque to Ukraine. Without US support, there is no way that Ukraine's willpower to fight and resources for war can be sustained.

Russia is also due to hold general elections in 2024. Putin will have two aims: first, to consolidate his own power; and second, to influence the outcome of the US election through a change in the battlefield situation. If Putin achieves great results, then Biden is very passive. So until the outcome of the US election is known, both sides will be going all out.

If it is still the Democrats in the US who win in 2024, I personally think the war will last for five years at most until the French elections in 2027. This is because the patience of the French people, including that of Europe, will be at its limit. The consequences of five years of this conflict for people's livelihoods will drive the far right to power. People's livelihoods are always talked about as a feeling, but you can't feel it if you don't experience it. Let me give you an example: I had a very strong feeling of happiness when I returned to Beijing, which none of you probably had. Because I was in a hotel, I could turn the temperature up to 25 degrees, 26 degrees, 27 degrees, and I would keep it on as long as I felt cold. But in France, just this one winter, the house can only be turned on to 19 degrees, so much so that my roommate is freezing and can't sleep at all and has to turn on the electric heater. And if you're travelling to France and staying in a hotel, it's exactly 17 degrees, and the office is 17 degrees, and then the government will check and fine anyone who breaks the temperature limit. I also went to Turkey in December and I arrived late on the plane, but when I looked at the whole of Istanbul, the lights were on. At the same time, in Europe, all the lights were off, the law says they are all turned off at the end of the day, just to save energy, but the hotels in Turkey were warm and toasty. What do you mean by people's livelihood? This is called livelihood. If 1.4 billion of us lived in a 19 degree winter, I think it would be very difficult to bear.

Russia's delaying tactics can also serve the strategic purpose of compromising Europe and the US after it is unable to achieve a quick victory. The external conflicts that the US is involved in, we find that as soon as time goes by and public opinion changes, then we have to stop the war or withdraw. Because we know that in the French elections last year, the far right got more than 40% and has completely transformed itself into a normal party. So if we go through these five more years of hardship, public opinion I think will completely reverse. If the far right comes to power, it is anti-immigration, anti-EU and anti-euro, and France is the core country of the EU, that will lead to a very serious political consequence - the EU may go into big trouble, i.e. face the risk of possibly surpassing the UK's exit from the EU.

2，The problem of escalating war

As far as I can see, the war has been escalating in small increments since it broke out, and it has escalated again recently. The Czech Republic has started supplying fighter jets to Ukraine, and the US has not voiced any opposition. This is actually in line with the pattern of all wars in history, as long as they are fought, they will keep escalating until they are separated into winners and losers, or until neither side can afford it.

But to escalate to a nuclear war, there is only one possibility, and that is for Russia to lose badly, risking the loss of all its land in the Ukraine and Crimea. For this would have serious political consequences in Russia and shake Putin's power. We know what this nuclear weapon is for, it's to save lives. Why does North Korea want to develop nuclear weapons? It is to learn from the lessons of Gaddafi in Libya and Saddam in Iraq. So at the extreme moment, it is impossible for Russia not to use nuclear weapons.

In other words, as long as conventional weapons can be fought to a stalemate, or Russia has a slight advantage, there will be no escalation to nuclear war. Of course, there is also the European view that China not betraying Russia would also give Russia the confidence not to go to extremes. I guess if China were to talk to Europe, it would probably say the same thing - that if China were to abandon Russia now, it would force him to use extraordinary means, which would be worse.

3，Prognosis for the outcome of the war

The final outcome, in theory, is one of two things: a split or a draw.

If Putin can't hold on to power, then Ukraine wins. If the conflict triggers a sudden political change in Europe, such as a far-right party coming to power in France, it's Ukraine that loses. Both of these possibilities are due to what? Political reasons. We know that wars are all in the service of politics, and as long as political objectives are not accomplished, wars will continue to be fought.

If none of the above occurs, that is, if there is no winner, then it is a draw, i.e. Russia can achieve the kind of result it did in the Korean War by virtue of its delaying strategy. That would be in Russia's core interests, after all, Ukraine is not a member of the EU, nor NATO, and the EU is not invested in Ukraine, unlike Afghanistan - where negotiations would begin without much investment. This is one of my judgments, which of course will soon be able to be verified.

II. The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on Europe.

1, Europe is one of the biggest losers of this conflict

Before this conflict occurred, the United States was supposed to contain both China and Russia, and the strategic environment for Europe was the best at that time. Because both China and Russia were moving closer to Europe, both sides needed him, and the China-Europe Investment Agreement was also signed in this context. At that time, the US made many concessions to Europe after Biden's arrival, including the lifting of sanctions and the trade war.

But after this conflict, we saw that the China-Europe Investment Agreement was frozen, Nord Stream II was not used and Nord Stream I was blown up. This means that all of Europe's strategic gains have been lost: Russia's energy, China's markets and technology - we made many concessions under the China-EU investment agreement in order to obtain strategic needs with economic concessions - have all been lost. We lost it all.

And the war in Ukraine has led to a refugee crisis, with Europe bearing the brunt of the costs of sanctions and the security costs. Europe is now dependent on the US for both security and energy. As we know, as a major power or a major international force, it must have strategic space, strategic space, it must be able to move around, it cannot say that there is no second choice but to do so. Russia, of course, is the worst offender, with nothing left but China. Europe is relatively better off with China in addition to the United States. And what is China? It is the only country that can meet and talk to all the leaders of the countries. We are in the best strategic position, we can also visit Russia and meet Putin; we can also be in Bali and meet Biden; the French president can also come and visit then. We can meet anyone. We have the best strategic space.

For the United States, he wants to create a Russia without Europe, a Europe without Russia, and a Europe without China, so that the forces of China, Russia and Europe, instead of forming a combined force, are scattered against each other, and are opposed and consumed by each other. This is the ideal state of affairs for the United States. At present, we have achieved our goal for Russia and Europe, that is, Europe loses Russia and Russia loses Europe; China and Europe have partially achieved their goal, not all of them - for example, Europe cannot use China's 5G technology and we cannot use the Dutch lithography technology, right? It means that you can't complement each other's strengths.

It's not a question of who sanctions who, the US is making it impossible for China and Europe to complement each other and for both sides to hurt each other. If this conflict continues, the cost to Europe will rise from the strategic and economic level to the political level, leading to the rise to power of the far right in the major countries. Italy is already in power on the far right, and once that happens, the risk of the EU breaking up is very high.

It is generally accepted that if Russia fails, the risk is high and the country could disintegrate, but the risk for the EU is even higher than for Russia. Not to mention the defeat of Ukraine, even if the war continues to drag on, the EU is in danger of disintegrating. So it is important for the EU to end this conflict as soon as possible. But what do we see him doing? On the contrary, what he has done is to perpetuate the conflict. Because the aid he is giving to Ukraine is not enough to end the conflict, but only to continue it. Because he doesn't dare to provide planes, he doesn't dare to send troops, right, he can only give this aid, and this aid can only perpetuate the war.

What are the reasons for these problems in Europe? I generally say that Europe has lost its sense of political reality and geopolitical thinking. What are the causes? There are two main external and internal causes.

The external cause is the strong influence of the United States. In World War I, World War II and the Cold War, Europe was the main battlefield and the United States played a key decisive role as an ally, a process in which American influence and penetration was ubiquitous and deeply rooted in Europe. Pro-Americanism became mainstream in Europe at all levels, from the grassroots to the elite. French de Gaulleism is no longer mainstream, and many elites in the EU prefer to sacrifice their own interests to go along with the US. This is because in their minds, the interests of the US take precedence over those of Europe.

Let me give you an example from the UK. When May was Prime Minister, there was a top defence meeting, and those who attended the meeting at the time were required to sign a non-disclosure agreement, and the discussion was about what we were going to do about Huawei 5G. The meeting was held in the morning and it was decided that we would ban Huawei, at that time the Hong Kong issue had not yet come out, ah, the result was not expected, the newspapers exposed it in the evening. The confidentiality agreement was signed, the most core officials, the highest officials met in the morning, and the media exposed it in the afternoon. At that time, Prime Minister May was extremely angry and went to investigate. Guess who leaked the information? It was the Defence Minister. This means that he would rather lose his official position than cooperate with the US by leaking this information. Of course this Minister of Defence was immediately fired. It is proof that the US penetration of Europe is so strong. We can't even imagine that the British defence minister, who thinks that the national interests of the UK are not as important as the national interests of the US. Or my personal interests are important because I was supported by the Americans, so it is understandable why the German Greens do not care at all about German interests, let alone Chinese interests or European interests, and only cooperate fully with the US.

At the same time the US uses its technology and various facilities to keep a permanent surveillance on the leaders of Europe. In 2013, Snowden exposed the Prism program, which was the inside story of the wiretapping of European leaders. 2021, two years ago, on May 31, the Danish media broke the news that the US National Security Agency had used its cooperation with the Danish intelligence service to wiretap EU leaders and senior officials, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel. What is the purpose of his wiretapping? One is of course to find out what their positions are and, more importantly, to get a handle on them. Don't you listen? If you don't listen, do you still want to vote? I'll throw out your leverage before the election, and you'll be finished, and your reputation will be ruined. That's what the US can do. Or we can also think that the British defence minister, he has a handle in the hands of the Americans, not necessarily a combination of interests, there may be a handle in the hands of people, you do not tell me, I will throw out to you, you are still in ruins. So in this case, when the US needs the EU to cooperate with him against China, he can also ask for it, he can also demand it, and he can even force it. This is the external reason.

One of the internal causes is the supremacy of EU values. There is much evidence of this: for example, the overthrow of the Gaddafi government in Libya by the EU in the name of democracy, which resulted in the refugee crisis and was the final straw that broke the British exit from the EU.

For the Chinese, sometimes when we are in the middle of it, we don't feel that our level leaders are at such a high level. In fact, if you compare them, I think Chinese leaders are of a very high standard. For example, we have a bottom line in our diplomacy, which is that nothing can happen to our neighbouring countries, no chaos, no war. Because when something happens, how close our neighbouring economies are, there will be losses, there will be refugees, and we will have to deal with it, we will have to solve it, right? We drew a red line, including when Burma was fighting a civil war and said this shell hit our territory. Our China's drew a very clear red line, the neighbouring countries just can't have things like this, you can make noise or make a scene. But look at Libya, Sarkozy just took the initiative and had to just go and hit him. At that time, Gaddafi told them that if I fell, the refugee crisis including the rise of Islamic State terrorists was made very clear to him, but no one listened. Gaddafi and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair were on very good terms at the time. How good were they? It was Gaddafi's son who wrote his thesis and sent it to Blair for him to revise. The personal relationship was so good. When Gaddafi went to Blair, Blair discussed the matter and finally gave him the answer: you leave Libya. As a result, Gaddafi did not accept it either, and the fight ended up like this, with no place to die and the refugee crisis breaking out.

So I think China is still very clever. Many countries around the world are now facing three major crises - an energy crisis, an inflation crisis and a food crisis. Does China have one of these three? Any time one of them catches up, society will be in chaos. This comparison shows how high we are in China. China's food reserves are 50% of the world's. Our leadership is aware of this.

This Russia-Ukraine conflict too, is why war has broken out in Europe again? It would not have happened if the Europeans had this bottom-line thinking of China. When we look at the EU, what has he done? Before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the EU was actively supporting the eastward expansion of NATO on the one hand; on the other hand, it was desperately trying to strengthen its energy dependence on Russia, which are two completely opposite objectives and are very absurd and completely lacking in political realism. When the conflict broke out, Europe lost Russian energy and markets in this way, and both sides lost.

But in reality no other country has forgotten about geopolitics. I once said in an article that the US could abandon the Afghan government, which it had supported for 20 years, and abandoned it to the Taliban. So why can't Europe abandon Ukraine? What is the relationship between Ukraine and you, Europe? It's not a member of Europe, it's not a member of NATO, and you didn't say that you had sent troops and spent trillions of euros to support the Ukrainian government like the US did, did you? How can Europe not abandon Ukraine when the US has invested so much in it?

Earlier this year, former Israeli Prime Minister Bennett broke the news in a media interview that he had brokered the conflict between Russia and Ukraine when it first broke out, and that both sides had successfully agreed to give in. Russia also promised not to de-Nazify and de-militarise, and Ukraine promised not to join NATO, but this was eventually vetoed by Biden. Because Biden saw this as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to weaken both Russia and the EU. So I think the bright line in today's international situation is for the US to weaken China and Russia, and the dark line is to weaken the EU.

The US wants to weaken all potential rivals that could replace itself. For example, this time it has succeeded in weakening Russia and the European Union.

The US has not yet achieved its goal of weakening China. But why is the US speculating so much about "Ukraine today and Taiwan tomorrow"? Doesn't the US know that China is not a country like Russia, Japan or Germany? They actually know it very well.

There is something very strange here, and it concerns the perception of the image of China and Russia in Europe. After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it became clear that China and Russia are different cultures and have different ways of dealing with problems. We would have thought that China's image in Europe would have come up at once, saying look what Russia did, we are peaceful, right? We didn't do that.

As a result, the polls in France are that we actually don't have as good an image as Russia; our leader actually doesn't have as good an image as Putin. That's the kind of thinking they have now. So why is the US hyping this up so hard? He wants to reach the point where international capital and multinational companies have to distance themselves from China. "He's about to fight, what are you going to do if he fights", right? "You have to consider if you are diversifying, what supply chain, industrial chain diversification". In short, the United States wants to use the Russia-Ukraine conflict to weaken China, to hype the "Taiwan Strait War", so that if I were a foreign capital, I would not dare to invest in China anymore, what if you fight again? Like Russia, once the war starts, capital will have to abandon and withdraw. The US is actually using this to weaken us, and the speculation is for this purpose.

Now that Europe is facing a difficult situation, China is actually not doing any harm to Europe, because China and Europe are so far apart that there is no geopolitical conflict, no security conflict. As long as there is no security conflict, everything else is fine. In addition, China is the only force that Europe can rely on, so logically, Europe should have very good relations with China and its public opinion, intellectuals and media should be very friendly to us. But in reality the opposite is true. Their attacks on us in China are at least very similar, if not more so, than those on Russia. Europe simply does not see that there is no security conflict with China and that we need each other.

That is why I say that he has lost his sense of political reality and his geopolitical thinking.

The second internal cause is the structural division within the EU. In fact, the structure of the EU is very much like Ukraine - Ukraine is pro-Russian in the east and pro-European in the west; so is the EU, with the east being pro-American and France and Germany being European in the west. When the war in Iraq took place in 2003, it was France and Germany that opposed it and Poland that supported it. In order to avoid division, the EU came up with a policy that there would be no unified foreign policy towards Iraq, and each country could choose what to do. This was to avoid divisiveness.

This time, in the face of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the EU is divided again: Poland and other Eastern European countries have been very active in assisting Ukraine, while at the same time condemning and blaming France and Germany for their passive attitude. When the war broke out, Germany donated 5,000 helmets, and Ukraine was very upset, saying, "Are you going to donate diapers to us next? It was only in the end that Germany and France had to raise the amount of aid under various pressures.

In the eyes of France and Germany, Russia is not a threat to them.

For France, throughout French history for over a thousand years, it was Britain that was the biggest threat, later Germany was the biggest threat, Russia was never a threat to France, France did threaten Russia. And Russia and France have long been allies.

For its part, Germany today no longer shares a border with Russia and has many buffers, so there is no security threat either. The German economy again needs Russia's cheap energy (there is no alternative). Germany can put up 200 billion euros to subsidise its own energy in the short term, but that's fine for one or two years, how many years can you subsidise? And Germany is a very industrialised manufacturing country, we know that energy is the main cost of manufacturing, how can German manufacturing be sustainable in the face of such high costs? So last year Germany had a trade deficit, which had never been there before. The competitiveness of the German industrial manufacturing industry has all but declined. Because Germany is not a normal country, it cannot engage in military or foreign politics, and its only pillar in the world is the economy.

2. The US strategic objectives in the Russia-Ukraine conflict

So, is the ultimate goal of the US to bring down Russia? What are the implications of the Russia-Ukraine conflict for Sino-American, Sino-European, European and American relations?

As mentioned above, the US strategic goal of weakening Russia in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been achieved and will become more and more effective over time. Russia it can only rely on China, completely losing its strategic space and the markets, technology and capital of Europe and the US.

In the current international reality, if you lose the markets, technology and capital of Europe and the US, you will certainly not be able to develop. Russia's economy only accounts for 2% of the world's total, while the entire Western camp accounts for 60%.

But I don't think it is the aim of the US to bring Russia down, this has to be analysed from a geopolitical point of view, i.e. it is not in the interest of the US to bring Russia down. This is because a Russia of a certain strength can hold the EU in check, and it can also hold China in check. If Russia were to collapse and become a large Saudi Arabia, this would not only remove a major geopolitical threat for both the EU and China, but would also turn Russia into a force at its disposal, just as Canada is for the US. This would not be in the interests of the US. Of course, in terms of international politics, neither the UK, Russia nor the US want a strong and unified EU.

The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on relations between Europe and the United States is twofold: first, Europe's increased dependence on the United States; and second, Europe's growing discontent with the United States. At a time when Europe was bearing the major costs and expenses of the war, the US was making a fortune selling gas to Europe at four times the price of its own market. At the time Europe went to protest that this was not the price at which it was selling to its allies, to which the US replied dryly: this was caused by Russia, not me. The US then introduced the Inflation Reduction Act, which seriously undermined European interests. The US basically ate up the EU, and no matter what it did Europe would not rebel.

3. The impact on China

After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the back-to-back strategic partnership between China and Russia has not changed. China and Russia have a "strategic partnership", and of the many levels of partnership that China has, the only one that has "collaboration" is Russia. In the past, China needed Russia more, but now Russia needs China more. But one important aspect of the relationship is that Russia has long been more proactive, despite the huge disparity in power between the two sides and Russia's dependence on China. Between Russia and China it is Russia that has the initiative, not us.

The reasons for this are twofold: one is the context of the strategic game between China and the United States; the other is that Russia has a long and complex diplomatic experience.

China, which has been dominant in East Asia for a long time, has been largely undiplomatic. China has always played the role of an arbitrator - when something goes wrong in any country, China steps in to maintain the stability of the East Asian dynastic order, and no country can challenge us, nor do we need allies at all, and no country is qualified to be China's ally. So China basically had no sense of diplomacy, no concept of diplomacy, and no experience of diplomacy. But Europe, on the contrary, has been engaged in diplomacy for centuries.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is also a result of Russia's initiative to play the China card. Russia has three active uses for China.

One is to take advantage of the fact that China is the main containment rival of the United States, so that even if Russia takes on Ukraine, the United States will not really throw all its weight behind the European side.

The second is to take advantage of China's strategic need for Russia and having to provide economic support. Although the energy he sells us is very cheap - the French press says that Russia sells us oil at $25 a barrel, and of course, India and Turkey are similar. But China has to buy, i.e. it has to support him, and it cannot afford to lose Russia.

The third is that what Russia has gained in Ukraine could be recognised by the US in the future when the conflict between China and the US intensifies, in return for Russia's support. The US is sacrificing Ukraine's interests in exchange for Russia being on his side. The United States is a master of international relations and is good at shedding other people's blood for its own benefit, i.e. taking other countries' interests in exchange. He is the same with Taiwan. The US would not trade Hawaii with us, but Taiwan is China's, and we will not pay for our own.

The strategic gains China has made as a result of the Russia-Ukraine conflict are a by-product of Russia's initiative, not something that China has engineered itself, but a pie in the sky. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has distracted the US, Russia is more dependent on China due to Western sanctions and isolation, and the EU will not contain China in tandem with the US because Russia is a major threat ...... These strategic gains are not the result of our initiative design, just like 9/11, it is pure luck. This is how the Sino-Russian relationship works, the initiative is not ours because Russia has a long history of very experienced and proactive diplomacy towards Europe. Now after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia is highly dependent on China, but its initiative remains undiminished. For example, the Russian side has said that it has repeatedly taken the initiative to publicise that the Chinese President will visit, and we have not had much of a positive response.

In terms of US-China relations, the impact of the conflict has been minimal, with little change in the strategic game between the two sides, except that their relationship has become more complex. The US wants to use this conflict both to weaken China and to decouple the EU from China, and to damage Sino-Russian relations. If China helps the EU, it undermines Russian-Chinese relations. If China is completely on Russia's side, it undermines Sino-European relations. In fact, we can see how fragile Sino-American relations are now, just by the matter of a balloon. If it was an Australian balloon floating over, nothing would happen; a Chinese balloon floating over would not.

4, what policy measures should China take to maximize its own interests in the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Now that Russia and the European and American-backed Ukraine are at a stalemate, China is the only third-party force capable of changing the situation. From this perspective, China is the biggest decisive force in this conflict.

From the perspective of national interests, it is in China's best interest for this conflict to last, that is, for Russia, the United States and Europe to engage in a three-way melee, while we stay out of the way and you consume each other while I focus on development. Ukraine consumes as many weapons in a month as the US produces in a year. If we fought for ten years, it would be equivalent to consuming 120 years of US production. One 155mm shell, 4,000 euros, 100 million euros is 2,500 rounds, and it is shot in about one hour. This sales volume is very, very large and even affects US arms sales to Taiwan.

Why has the United States been able to become the world's number one power? It is because after World War II, the United States' allies, the United States' enemies, were crippled; Britain and France were crippled, leaving the United States itself, which naturally became the greatest hegemon, and the United States accounted for two-thirds of the world's industrial output in World War II. In contrast, China's current situation is to stay out of the way and focus on development, watching the US, Europe and Russia consume each other.

The second advantage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict for China: it avoids the worst kind of external environment - the US-Russia alliance. For the US, the worst environment is for China, Russia and Europe to join forces. For China, the worst environment is for Russia, the US and Europe to join forces. This is because American scholars and think tanks have been proposing for years that the US should join forces with Russia to contain China. It is the same as when China and the US joined forces to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and China contributed greatly to the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The third is to deepen Russia's dependence on China and ensure our energy security. We have a shortcoming, an inherent weakness, in that we rely on imports for 90% of our energy, which is more dangerous than Japan was in World War II, I'm afraid. In the past, our negotiations with Russia on energy have been difficult, even more so than our accession to the WTO. Because energy is one of Russia's greatest strategic weapons, it has been played to the hilt, playing China off, Japan off and Europe off. It was only in 2014, because of the Crimea affair, that Russia signed an energy agreement with China.

The fourth is that as long as the Russia-Ukraine conflict exists, Europe will treat Russia as the number one threat, not China. This creates a fundamental divergence between the strategic objectives of the EU and the US. The US considers China to be the number one threat, while Europe considers Russia to be the number one threat, and it is on its doorstep, so Europe will not follow the US strategy of containment against China.

Fifth, it means that China can use the Russian card as a sort of hedge against US pressure and bargain with Europe as a bargaining chip. Now one of the main issues that the US and Europe want to talk to China about is actually the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which is a card that is purely for nothing. Europe says you China can not aid Russia. I said fine, I won't aid, so what do you give me in return? Our foreign minister, Qin Gang, said, "If the United States won't let me sell weapons to Russia, then why are you selling weapons to Taiwan, so we have another card that we can morally accuse the United States of.

Of course, good offices to persuade peace must also be done. For one thing, morality is very important for great powers; for another, it can improve Sino-European relations. I just recently saw a German media outlet say that the fact that both sides of the Chinese proposal are opposed to it means that the proposal still has a chance; a proposal that only has the support of one side is sure to fail, and both sides have criticisms and affirmations, so that it can be used as a basis for talks. China's good offices can also gain the approval of non-Western countries, because non-Western countries are now thinking about the energy crisis, the food crisis, and also have wars to deal with, like Syria and other places, so that they will think: why doesn't the US care? Why doesn't Europe care? Only China does. So this Chinese proposal is attractive to these countries.

The first thing we need to make clear is that China's strategy towards Russia is part of its strategy towards the US. It is at the service of the US-China strategic game. At present, the only two gaps in the US geopolitical encirclement of China are Russia in the north and ASEAN in the south, and he basically has us all surrounded. There is India to the west, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines to the east, and only the two gaps between Russia to the north and ASEAN to the south have not yet been closed. Secondly, historically speaking, it is impossible for Russia to be a world class country, the only exception being Stalin who brought the Soviet Union to superpower status after World War II. But the fact that he was able to disintegrate so quickly in peacetime shows that the country's national strength and civilizational heritage could not bear the burden of becoming a first-class nation. This becoming a world hegemon is not an easy thing to do, you don't have the ability to do it, you can't necessarily pick it up. It's like a child, you pick a 100 pound weight that's impossible, you know that right. Russia as a country, he didn't have the means to be a world class country, he couldn't afford to pick it, and his peaceful dissolution shows this thing.

Russia today is economically dependent on the sale of raw materials and weapons, and politically dependent on a single strongman, and that's his path dependency now. It is not just today that Russia is like this, it was like this in the past, in the Soviet Union, and it was also like this in history, that is, my economic development was based on the sale of raw materials and weapons, and politically on a single strongman. That is, if I had this very powerful and strong leader, my country would be rich and strong, or else it would decline. Now there is also an ageing population and a declining birth rate. So in the future Russia will have to remain a second-rate power. Like France and Germany, it will be second-rate and will never reach the level of world domination of Britain and the US. As long as China does not have any problems of its own, Russia will not have the strength to threaten China's security. Of course he could defect to the US, that's another matter. In the long run, China's support for Russia will not have strategic adverse consequences. What does this mean? Right now the US is reflecting on the Cold War, when we supported China at the cost of supporting a rival. We are now supporting Russia, so we have to consider whether we will support an adversary in the future? Because we don't just look at one step in our strategy, we look at two or three steps, right? We have to look further. That is, our support for Russia today will not lead to a strong threat in the future. Those are the reasons.

Also, in the worst case scenario, if Russia loses the war, it will not fall to the West. Many people say that if Russia is defeated, a pro-Western regime will emerge. My view is not, and this is for two reasons.

First, the West would not really aid Russia, as it did when the Soviet Union collapsed. At that time, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West actually fell on its sword. This included the eastward expansion of NATO, which eventually forced Russia to come over to our side. It also forced Yeltsin to choose Putin. The first reason for this is that the West would not aid him and would fall on his sword.

Secondly, China today is different and has the ability to assist Russia. It's not the same as when the Soviet Union collapsed, when we were too weak, when we couldn't protect ourselves, when our GDP per capita was a few hundred dollars, when we couldn't help Russia at all, when there was nothing Russia could do but beg Europe and the US. But today it is different. It is easy for us to help Russia, as our GDP in Guangdong province is higher than that of Russia.

Of course, if Russia loses the war, it will certainly seek to improve its relations with the West, and the West, especially the US, will want to draw Russia in out of a need to contain China. Russia would also play the China card against the US and the US card against China out of the need for its own interests. It will revert to this traditional diplomacy, which is I'll take both sides I want both.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported him, and he received a lot of aid from the Soviet Union, such as the first steel plant built by the Soviet Union and the weapons from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave India far more than it gave China. In fact, Indian diplomacy was also very good, except that his economic development was not good for another reason.

Russia will certainly be both sides of the fishery, but Russia has a bottom line, that is, he is clear that the United States will not really aid themselves, but also just use him to contain China, once the United States to achieve the purpose of Russia is useless. In fact, India is also very clear, India's position in the West all lies in China. Without China, India will be worthless in the West. Therefore, India does not want China to collapse. The more China stands in front, the more India will be able to get aid from the West and make profits. He is in trouble with China, but he knows that China must hold up. He is worth it just because China is there. It's actually the same with Taiwan. Many people say that Taiwan is important because China is important, and if China collapses, Taiwan will probably be left alone.

Of course, if Russia is defeated, for China, we need to give Russia a big enough aid. We also need to pull them in, and China needs Russia more in the face of a post-conflict world. Because that's when the dominance of the bilateral relationship changed again, when we were the ones asking for Russia's help. Now Russia is asking for help, and after the war, we will be on the front line of confrontation with the US again, and we will need Russia even more then.

That's all I have to share with you about the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Sub-theme 2: Macron's visit to China ahead

I will share with you two parts of Macron's visit to China.

1. Why is Macron's visit to China a very rare break with diplomatic practice? 

Why is Macron breaking diplomatic conventions? Because in November 2019, he just visited China. According to the usual practice, the Chinese side should return the visit first, and he will come back after the return visit. The result is that Macron came back to visit China without waiting for a return visit from the Chinese side.

This "break with diplomatic practice" reflects the fact that France needs China more than ever. We know that although President de Gaulle established diplomatic relations with China, he unfortunately did not come to China, and he wrote a chapter of his memoirs dedicated to China. What was the reason for this? He wanted the Chinese leader to visit France first, and then he would return. But China had a principle in its diplomacy at that time, that is, when dealing with capitalist countries, you must come first, and only after you have come can I go. The two sides were at an impasse and the visit did not take place. Under President Pompidou, the same thing happened again, no one came first and no one could go. Why did Pompidou break with the usual practice and come to China later? Because he had cancer, terminal, and he wouldn't have had the chance in his life if he hadn't come. Pompidou did not want to make the same mistake as De Gaulle, so he made an exception and visited China first. The second time is Macron, theoretically it should be China first to return the visit, he can not wait to come again, breaking the diplomatic practice.

The reason for this is that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has led to great difficulties in Europe, such as the plight of heating in winter, and the food problem, last year it was mainly energy prices, this year it is the turn of food prices, usually about 2 euros a kilogram of tomatoes, now the starting price is 6 euros. But at the same time, French people's wages have basically not increased, but prices have tripled, the people are very difficult. So from the French and European point of view, we want to end this conflict as soon as possible.

The second reason is that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has made the division and self-interest within the EU even worse. There is also a very fierce competition in relations with China. For example, at the end of last year, German Chancellor Scholz wanted to come, France was originally against it and Macron proposed that Germany and France visit China together. But Germany was more anxious than France, proving that Germany needs China more than France. Because Germany is not a normal country, its world can be based on the economy, and the two pillars of the German economy, one is the Russian energy, and the other is the Chinese market. Now that Russian energy is gone and the Chinese market is the only pillar left, Scholz must do everything he can to keep it, so he is anxious to come. But Scholz had to visit China first, accepting our conditions for the prevention of epidemics, and he stayed in China for less than 24 hours before returning, a very tight schedule. The German Chancellor came, and the Italian Prime Minister also said at the G20 that he would come, so France was under great pressure. If he waited until the President returned to visit, he would probably fall behind Italy again, so he had to come early.

The third factor is the United States. After Biden took power, he did not change his "America First" strategy, and Biden's methods are far more ruthless than Trump's. Trump is a fly in the ointment, fighting a war of words can, not do a few real things. In contrast, Biden has directly grabbed France's $60 billion submarine order, and has also created an "inflation reduction bill" and a "chip subsidy bill", hitting Europe where it hurts. Last November, Macron's visit to the United States came to nothing on key issues, and the United States did not budge at all, both because of its strength and the inevitable result of Europe's over-reliance on the United States. The United States has eaten Europe, no matter how to mess with you, you can not do anything. Therefore, France to change this embarrassing situation, there is only China card can play.

The above three reasons led Macron to break the principle of diplomatic reciprocity.

2, Can France and China work together to deal with a century of change?

I think it is difficult.

The first reason is the American factor. The United States has completely kidnapped Europe, including the kidnapping of values, national security and personal kidnapping, such as tapping the mobile phones of European leaders, mastering private black information, thus taking advantage of human weaknesses. A person's political career is bound to be problematic and flawed from the beginning to the end. For example, during the previous French presidential campaign, former World Bank president and French presidential candidate Kahn was unaccountably screwed in the US by a "sexual assault case". Five years later, the popular French presidential candidate, Fillon, had a scandal involving his family's "empty pay" which led to his outright withdrawal from the election before Macron had a chance to be elected. I'm afraid that the parties concerned already had this kind of black information and could wait patiently for years or decades before using it to kill him in one blow. The same method has been used by the US to get rid of the Japanese Prime Minister many times, all by throwing black information.

The second reason is that the US is taking advantage of the dependence of those small countries in the EU on its own security, including the principle of consistent decision-making in the EU to undermine Sino-European relations. Generally speaking, small countries in the international community do not take the initiative to provoke large countries, Lithuania is an exception. It did not dare to do what the US did, nor did France and Germany, nor did the UK, but Lithuania did it, with the manipulation of the US behind it. The US is using the conflict between Lithuania and China to undermine Sino-European relations. In fact, the EU does not approve of Lithuania doing this, but China has sanctioned Lithuania, so the EU has to confront China to defend the interests of the whole group.

The third reason is the supremacy of EU values, which has been mentioned earlier and will not be repeated.

The fourth reason is the divided internal structure of the EU, which makes it impossible to bring all policies together and makes it a scattered mess.

In fact, frankly speaking, France has many cards to play. I have also exchanged ideas with French scholars, but none of them can be used in practice. For example, China is going to hold a Belt and Road Summit this year, can Macron come and take part in it? No Western power has attended yet, and he could naturally get a lot in return for coming to the meeting.

In recent years, the UK was the first to join the ADB and Italy was the first to sign the Belt and Road Memorandum, without France. But the first Western power to establish diplomatic relations with China was France, General de Gaulle. The "first" would have had a different meaning and effect, and would have paid dividends, but France could not do it.

In addition, France can support China's reunification. Europe now only says in general terms that it adheres to the one-China policy, but in fact, the "one China" advocated by China has three meanings: firstly, there is only one China in the world and the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government; secondly, Taiwan is part of China; thirdly, reunification.

The West's "one China policy", on the other hand, means only the establishment of diplomatic relations with mainland China. However, Taiwan and France have little interest in each other. If France were to openly declare its support for cross-strait reunification, it could naturally get a lot in return, but France cannot do it.

Besides, does Macron have the guts to make France the first major Western country to give visa-free access to Chinese tourists? France's number one industry is tourism, and doing a visa waiver would be beneficial to both sides, and he won't do it.

Are these cards, in fact, hard to play? Firstly, he has nothing to actually give, the price paid is very low; secondly, these cards do not involve core French interests, they are just icing on the cake; thirdly, the returns are high. But Macron can do neither. Because Western political correctness is at stake here, so-called morality, image, etc. But what de Gaulle did back then - amending the constitution, creating a fifth republic, making Algeria independent, withdrawing from NATO, establishing diplomatic relations with China, vetoing Britain's application to join the EU twice, improving relations with Germany - which of the above is not much more difficult than the ones I have just mentioned? than the ones I just mentioned? And Macron can't do any of them.

So I don't think Macron's visit to China will be a real breakthrough, but a symbolic one. Just like Macron's visit to the United States, where the United States gave a big welcome, there is symbolic meaning. Diplomatic symbolism is sometimes substantive, which is still useful. China and France need to show a good bilateral relationship to the United States, to Europe and to Russia, and this diplomatic display alone is still meaningful.

Well, that's all I have to share with you today.