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The Post-NeoLiberal Globalization Era

Article by Xia Guohan

Originally published in World Cultures - Focus, Nov, 2022

I. Preface: The US "Chip War" against China

——A microcosm of "reverse globalisation

On 2-3 August 2022, the then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, made a high-profile visit to Taiwan, triggering a major international diplomatic incident. Compared to the numerous media speculations, I believe that Pelosi's visit to Taiwan had only one real strategic objective - TSMC. Specifically: one is to block TSMC's high-end chip cooperation with mainland China, the second is to force TSMC to set up a factory in the United States, and the third is that the United States hopes to recruit all the chip talents in Taiwan to prevent them from flowing to the mainland. The logic behind this is: one of the core areas of competition between China and the United States in the future will be the digital field, whether it is artificial intelligence, Internet of everything, cloud computing or autonomous driving, drones, wearable devices, etc., all need to rely on the sky chip supply, and high-end chip production is the current shortcomings of mainland China, in contrast, the international high-end chip industry chain is almost firmly controlled by the United States. But it is worth mentioning that the United States itself is mainly responsible for high-end chip design and development, and not directly engaged in chip production, its high-end chip sources are also imported from TSMC and Samsung, of which TSMC accounted for nearly 90% of the share. Therefore, the US has chosen to take advantage of TSMC first in its "chip war" against China, in an attempt to get China's neck in a way that will bring the global high-end chip production line back to its home country, with a view to gaining an advantage in future strategic competition.

There is ample evidence to support this theory: the day after Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, she met with TSMC founder Zhang Zhongmou and TSMC Chairman Liu Deyin, and lobbied Liu to cooperate with the US Chip and Technology Act of 2022 through video meetings; on 9 August, US President Joe Biden officially signed the above-mentioned bill, which provides $52.7 billion in financial support for the semiconductor industry and $24 billion worth of investment tax credits for companies. On 9 August, President Biden signed the bill, which provides $52.7 billion in financial support to the semiconductor industry and $24 billion in investment tax credits to encourage companies to develop and manufacture chips in the US, while the Chip Act focuses on restricting US companies from supporting the development and production of semiconductors in countries such as China (i.e. chip companies that receive subsidies from the US must cut off their cooperation with China); throughout August, several other US delegations fanned out after Pelosi's visit to Taiwan --Democratic Senator Edward Markey, Republican Senator Marsha Blackburn, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey and Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb. Holcomb (R). The visit of the two governors, in particular, was almost a clear reminder to TSMC that the White House has already made arrangements for you to locate a factory in the US, so move quickly; on October 7, the US government issued what it called the "strictest chip ban", listing 31 Chinese companies, research institutions and other groups as "unauthorized". On 7 October, the US government introduced what it called the "strictest chip ban", placing 31 Chinese companies, research institutions and other groups on an "unverified list" to restrict their access to certain regulated US semiconductor technology capabilities, and blackmailing US chip talent into giving up cooperation with China on the basis of their nationality ......

The US "chip war" against China is a typical case of "reverse globalisation" at the moment. The US wants to use administrative measures to forcibly cut off and reshape the pattern of the international chip industry chain, which has been market-oriented for many years, in order to gain a competitive advantage over China. However, chips are typically an "intermediate product" that cannot be sold directly to consumers and need to be made into "end consumer products" such as laptops, tablets, digital cameras and smart wearable devices before they can join the daily business cycle. The current pattern of the international chip industry chain is the natural result of years of globalised factor flows, in line with the laws of the market - the US has the ability to design and develop high-end chips, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan Province of China undertake chip manufacturing, while mainland China has the most complete manufacturing industry chain, and can turn The "intermediate product" chips can be processed into various electronic "end consumer goods" and then flow to the global market.

The US Chip Act is like a bull breaking into a china shop, disrupting the established order and creating a kind of multi-loss situation: on the one hand, the chip cut-off has really made Chinese technology companies suffer, for example, Huawei's high-end smartphones, which once had a market share close to Apple's, but are now in decline; on the other hand, the US crackdown has inspired China's determination to develop its own chips, and the government has planned to increase its support for the local chip industry. On the other hand, the US crackdown has inspired China to develop its own chips, and the government is planning to increase its support for the local chip industry in an attempt to get rid of its dependence on US chips. At the same time, the silicon-based chip "Moore's Law" is also failing, and the local chip industry in mainland China has been sluggish for a long time. In addition to insufficient investment in research and development, another important reason is that the Chinese chip market has long been monopolised by the US, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan chips, leaving the market space for mainland Chinese chip companies unable to support a virtuous positive economic cycle, and the United States "chip war" is equivalent to the initiative to give up part of the chip market in mainland China. Therefore, as long as there is sufficient capital and talent investment and local market substitution, mainland China's goal of conquering high-end chips is not out of reach. On the contrary, forcing the chip industry chain to return to China and cutting off the sale of high-end chips to China means that the White House must complete the "re-industrialization" as soon as possible and create a complete manufacturing system in China that can transform chips into various end consumer goods, in order to reshape another set of closed-loop industrial chain (the so-called "Otherwise, there will be no place to sell high-end chips in the United States, and they will eventually be reduced to "high-end technology rubbish".

At this point, the game situation has become very clear: it is only necessary to compare the success rate of China's "national system" to break through the high-end chip research and development and manufacturing, or the success rate of the United States "re-industrialization" to reshape the whole industrial chain system of local manufacturing is greater. The author is only quoting a brick and not making too many judgments, but what needs to be highlighted is that - the above strategic competitive posture would have been completely unnecessary under the framework of the unbroken "globalization".

The US "chip war" against China is a microcosm of "reverse globalisation". By reviewing the long historical logic chain of globalization, analyzing the theoretical basis and structural flaws of neoliberal globalization, this article hopes to explore the causes of "reverse globalization" and to look forward to the changes in the international situation in the "post-neoliberal globalization era".

II. A brief trace of the long historical logic chain of globalization.

The millennium game of land power vs sea power

Globalization in a broad sense refers to the long-distance exchange and connection between multiple civilisation centres, and the earliest "globalisation" should refer to the integration of land-based Eurasian commercial routes, while "Western-centrism" The "globalisation" in the context of "western centrism" is the globalisation of sea power in a narrow sense. From a long historical point of view, the globalisation of sea power and the globalisation of land power are in opposite directions, i.e. the more sea power globalisation flourishes, the more land power globalisation becomes distant.

The integration of the Eurasian trade routes, also known as the ancient 'Silk Road', first began during the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty (156-87 BC) when Zhang Qian was ordered to make an alliance with the Great Yuezhi, thus 'Chiseling Through' the Western region and opening up the Silk Road. During the Eastern Han period, around the 1st century AD, as the Mediterranean Rim was under Roman rule (Pax Romana) in a relatively stable political environment, the extravagant lifestyle of the Roman aristocracy created a great deal of demand, thus making the Silk Road relatively stable and Central Asia an important geo-hub.

Later, as the Roman Empire collapsed and China entered the Great Schism of the Wei and Jin Dynasties, the Silk Road links weakened until the revival of the Silk Road when Li Shimin, Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty, defeated the Turkic Empire and established the 'Khan of Heaven' system. Later, during the An Shi Rebellion, the Tubo Empire cut off the Western Corridor, leaving the northern route of the Silk Road weak, while the Abbasid dynasty (Black Food) rose to power in western central Eurasia and Islam flourished thereafter, keeping the southern route open.

In the 13th century, the Mongol Empire was founded and began its western conquests, with Badu, grandson of Genghis Khan and founder of one of the four Khanates, the Khanate of Chincha, leading his armies across Eastern and Central Europe. The golden family of the Mongol Empire was the first and only geopolitical integration of the Eurasian continent from east to west, indirectly facilitating the flow of people, goods and technology (such as gunpowder and compasses) around the world, as the Venetian merchants Marco Polo and his son travelled to the Yuan via the Silk Road.

At the end of the 13th century, the Ottoman Empire, which originated in the Anatolian peninsula, grew rapidly, eliminating the Byzantine Empire in 1453, setting its capital in Constantinople and claiming to be the Eastern Roman Empire. According to the mainstream European view, the rise of the Ottoman Empire, which lasted six centuries, blocked Europe's traditional trade routes to the East (i.e. the overland Silk Road) and forced the Europeans to find new routes, which forced the beginning of the Great Age of Sail (in fact, the maritime Silk Road was never discontinued, and the Egyptian port of Alexandria was a transit point for trade at the western end of the Silk Road, no less than at the western end of the overland Silk Road). The Europeans were clearly only making excuses for colonialism).

The 15th century saw the beginning of the Great Age of Navigation in Europe and the decline of the traditional Silk Road for 500 years. The Great Age of Navigation marked the full rise of maritime globalisation, and completed an upgrade in the geographical scope of globalisation by piecing together the Eurasian world islands and regions such as Africa, the Americas, Southeast Asia and Australia into a complete map of the world. 17th century, the Industrial Revolution, accompanied by European mercantilism, kicked off the Great Colonial Era with the wind of the Great Voyage, and the globalisation of maritime power was aided by industrialisation and colonisation ( The globalisation of maritime power was completed by industrialisation and colonisation (which provided abundant labour, land, markets and raw materials). At the same time, with the "Metternich parity" (the distribution of colonial benefits among colonial powers in exchange for peace on European soil), Europeans began to explore institutional models of globalisation, with the League of Nations and the Communist International after the First World War. "The League of Nations and the Communist International were both attempts to institutionalise the model of globalisation, but their practical results were poor, and even the fragile Versailles-Washington system directly contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War. The fragile "Versailles-Washington" system laid the groundwork for the outbreak of World War II.

After the Second World War, the first relatively successful global political framework was finally established, namely the United Nations system with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France as the core, which has continued to this day. However, with the fall of the iron curtain of the Cold War, the world was soon divided into three camps: the NATO/liberal capitalist camp, led by the United States, with its institutional framework of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, today's WTO) under the Bretton Woods system, which encompassed The second was the Warsaw Pact / Democratic Socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, whose institutional framework was a planned economic system under the "ECCU" model (mainly in Eastern Europe, China was also in the Soviet system at the beginning, but later completed its de-dependence and independence). The third is the group of countries outside the two camps (mostly members of the Non-Aligned Movement), represented by China and India.) Thus, the globalisation of the Cold War was clearly fragmented.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet system, the United States took advantage of the situation to monopolise the ultimate power of globalisation at sea, not only swallowing the legacy of the Soviet Union's "imperial whale" through the double expansion of NATO and the European Union, but also successfully subordinating the "Third World" countries to the US system. The unification of globalisation under the banner of "neo-liberalism" (the so-called "neo-liberal globalisation" was symbolised by the "Reagan Doctrine" and the "Thatcher Doctrine". Thatcherism", to which some scholars attribute the "reform and opening up" of China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping), "neoliberal globalisation" has also led to the "era of unipolar hegemony" of the United States. "unipolar hegemony".

But this era lasted only a decade or so: the events of September 11, 2001, led the US strategic community astray, shifting its global strategic direction from "great power competition" to "global counter-terrorism", which led to a deepening of its involvement in Afghanistan and Afghanistan. "This led to a deep involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and indirectly to the US sub-prime crisis in 2008, which also triggered the European sovereign debt crisis and the global financial tsunami from which the world has not yet emerged. As a result, a clear conservative, populist and "anti-globalisation" tendency began to emerge in the West, compounded by a growing "global governance deficit" and a clear "neoliberal globalisation". It also means that the globalisation of sea power, which has been dominated by the West for 500 years, is finally in decline.

In fact, the world has been trapped in a sort of regular crisis cycle since 2008: the Arab Spring in 2010, the wars in Libya and Syria in 2011, the Crimean crisis in 2014, Brexit in 2016, the trade war between the United States and China that began in 2018, and the new COVID-19 crisis that continues in late 2019. The COVID-19 new crown epidemic in late 2019, the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 ...... The world is entering "a century of unprecedented change" and according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) Globalization Index study (see chart below), globalization has clearly declined since 2008 (see chart below). According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) Globalisation Index (see chart below), globalisation has clearly declined since 2008 (61.1 to 53.5). Why, then, has neo-liberal globalisation, which has been going on for 40 years, suddenly been plagued by crises? What structural flaws have led to these crises? And does the decline in neoliberal globalisation of the oceans also mean that the interconnectivity mechanisms of the 'New World Island' of Eurasia might be revitalised? Let's start by analysing the theoretical flaws of neoliberal globalisation.

III. Endogenous flaws of neoliberal globalization and the rise of "counter-globalization"

1. Neo-liberal globalisation in the context of "world system theory

The theoretical foundation of neoliberal globalisation is liberal economics, based on Adam Smith's theory of international division of labour / free trade and David Ricardo's theory of "comparative advantage", which is indeed applicable to the European model of trade between countries. The so-called "optimal allocation of factors of production" and "complete free exchange of goods" constitute the basic logic of neoliberal globalisation.

The most important of these theories is the "world system theory" put forward by the "neo-Marxist" Emmanuel Wallerstein. "The most important contribution of this theory is the "centre-periphery-semi-periphery" structure of the capitalist world system: the centre countries are those that dominate the world system and dominate other countries by their advanced technology and industrial products; the peripheral countries are those that have to dominate other countries by their exports. The peripheral countries are those that have to be controlled by the central countries through the export of natural resources and primary products, while the semi-peripheral countries are those that can control the peripheral countries to some extent and are controlled by the central countries to some extent. At the same time, by analysing the history of capitalist development since the 16th century, Wallerstein also proposed a cyclical rhythm of the world system, i.e. an expansion-contraction cycle of the capitalist world system caused by the inherent contradiction between the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply of the world economy, based on the "Kondratieff" long-wave theory, which states that The long wave of the world system repeats itself every fifty years or so, with each period of stagnation providing the opportunity and impetus to reorganise the pattern of production in the world system and to prepare for the next cycle of expansion, with the cyclical rhythm leading to a relative shift in the position of the countries within the world system. The rise and fall of a country or society's position in the world system, and when and how it does so, is largely determined by the development cycles of the world system, in addition to the influence of its own efforts, and every time the world economy alternates between upward and downward movements, marginal and semi-marginal countries have the opportunity to move up. But whatever the internal changes, the pyramidal tripole structure of the world system is fixed, i.e. the rise of some countries is inevitably accompanied by the fall of others, and there is no such thing as simultaneous development of all countries or separate stages of development of individual countries and societies.

In the context of the "world system theory", the basic configurations of "neoliberal globalisation" can be deconstructed.

Firstly, the "central country" at the top of the pyramid, the United States, has a monopoly on high technology and dominates the world market. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the US dollar was decoupled from gold and all elements of the globalisation system could be redeemed by printing money, while the outsourcing of industries greatly reduced domestic inflation in the US, and almost all countries and regions where the industrial chain was transferred had a US presence. Almost all countries and regions where the industrial chain has moved have a US military presence (except China), and the political and security costs are manageable ....... All of this has contributed to the US's willingness to promote and sustain globalisation over the last 30 years or so.

Second, the "semi-fringe countries" located at the waist of the pyramid, the upper level is the core group of US allies, including the UK, Europe, Japan, South Korea and other core US allied countries, can share part of the core technology and high-end industries, that is, "the United States eat meat, allies drink soup"; the lower level is represented by China and ASEAN responsible for the middle class. The lower level is the East Asian manufacturing network, represented by China and ASEAN, which is responsible for the middle and lower end of the industrial chain.

Finally, the "peripheral countries" at the bottom of the pyramid are the resource countries represented by OPEC members, Russia, etc., including most developing countries.

2. The flaws of "neoliberal globalisation

The first is the fallacy of the classical theory of neoliberal economics itself, to name but two: the "comparative advantage" and the "demographic dividend". The former was originally studied in the context of European countries with similar levels of productivity, where the "relative scarcity" of factors of production reflects the "comparative advantage" of cross-border trade, but the model is clearly inappropriate for use between developed and developing countries, most of which However, this model is clearly inappropriate between developed and developing countries because most developing countries face an absolute scarcity of factors of production and have no "comparative advantage" without exchange chips; while the "demographic dividend" occurs mostly in the process of transferring manufacturing industries from developed to developing countries. In the process of transferring manufacturing chains from developed countries to developing countries, developing countries with absolute scarcity of production factors have nothing but "people" and "land (resources)", so cheap labor becomes their only "comparative advantage "The "sweatshop" is the fruit of the so-called "demographic dividend", the truth of which is that the cheap labour force of developing countries provides a dividend for the transnational capital of developed countries. The truth is that the cheap labour force in developing countries provides a dividend for the multinational capital of developed countries. Whenever developed countries want to take certain trade protection measures, they can directly link the "sweatshop" with human rights, environmental protection and dumping issues, and the "demographic dividend" immediately becomes a "demographic trap The "demographic dividend" immediately becomes a "demographic trap".

Secondly, globalisation has solved part of the problem of efficiency in wealth generation but not wealth distribution, resulting in a sharp division between rich and poor, which exists both between countries and within the same country. The last round of globalisation was still a continuation of the globalisation of maritime power, based on maritime transport and connected to important ports around the world. As a result of this, countries with sea power and control over key straits around the world have a clear advantage over landlocked countries, and the gap between coastal and landlocked regions of the same country has widened.

Thirdly, the entropy of the system increases. Firstly, the unbalanced flow of factors in globalisation, the last round of globalisation only emphasised the liberalisation of capital and trade, while population (labour) and technology remained barriers, the transfer of industrial chains led to the hollowing out of industries within developed countries, and social conflicts. Secondly, the development gap between the central and peripheral countries has narrowed, and emerging countries are pursuing a leap in the hierarchy within the system. The structural contradictions arising from this process will raise the cost of maintaining the stability of the system; again, the unipolar liberal hegemony of the United States has triggered resistance from other countries. The so-called "universal values", the attempt to assimilate other civilisations with the values of Christian civilisation and the export of the "democratic revolution" is in essence a 21st century "religious expansion", which has already Finally, the contradiction between globalisation, regionalisation and sovereign states is irreconcilable. The classical theory of globalisation holds that regional integration is the primary stage of globalisation and globalisation is the ultimate stage of regional integration, but in reality, any supranational organisation with a high degree of regional integration will naturally develop a kind of "circling However, in reality, supranational organisations with a high degree of regional integration will naturally develop a kind of "circled" local protectionism, thus resisting further globalisation (e.g. the European Union), while neoliberal globalisation theory calls for "small government, big market", i.e. weakening the functions of the sovereign state, which will also trigger a backlash from the resistance.

3. From "bottom-up" "anti-globalisation" to "top-down" "counter-globalisation"

One of the main contradictions in world politics is the conflict between the neoliberal globalisation camp and the anti-globalisation conservative populist camp. The early manifestations of the challenge to neoliberal globalisation were the "anti-globalisation" movement, which was characterised by a "bottom-up" approach, i.e. a civil society movement that originated at the social level. The best example of this was the famous 'Seattle Storm': on 30 November 1999, when the third WTO Ministerial Conference was held, more than 40,000 protesters gathered in Seattle to protest and prevent the conference from taking place. Starting with the destruction of the McDonald's fast food restaurant, a symbol of globalisation, the protesters confronted and clashed with the police, eventually delaying the start of the meeting by five hours, and by 3 December more than 500 people had been arrested. At the meeting, the US President's speech on trade protectionism was opposed and, ultimately, no agreement was reached. Since Seattle, millions of people in India, Britain, France, Bolivia, Switzerland, Brazil, Thailand and many other countries have taken to the streets in spontaneous protest. The Seattle storm was the first time that the protests of the anti-globalisation movement had had a real effect, and for the first time the voices of the anti-globalisation movement were heard worldwide. The main demands of the "anti-globalisation" movement were threefold: against the disparities caused by globalisation, against the globalisation of capitalism, and against the "colonisation" and "Americanisation" of globalisation. "It is organised by trade unions, art groups, landless peasants, indigenous groups, socialists, communists, anarchists, religious groups, traditional left-wing parties, conservatives and others.

The 2008 world financial crisis exposed the crisis that lurks in the context of neo-liberal globalisation, from which even the developed capitalist countries, which have dominated globalisation, are not immune. As a result, the trend of "counter-globalisation" intensified, characterised by a "top-down" approach, whereby governments began to cater to the public opinion of "anti-globalisation" groups, emphasising trade protection, immigration control, the return of nationalism, etc., and advocating a departure from the trend of globalisation from the sovereign state level. From 2016 to the present, several events have marked the acceleration of the "anti-globalisation" trend: firstly, the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2016, which marked another surge in the intensity of the game between sea and land power; secondly, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in the same year, which led to his "unilateralism" and his "unilateralism". Secondly, the election of Donald Trump as US President in the same year, which led to his "unilateralism" and withdrawal from a series of US-led international multilateral platforms such as the TPP and the UN Human Rights Council; thirdly, the trade war launched by the US against China in 2018, which has now evolved into a fierce "technology war", even with the Democratic Party's Biden in office. Even with the Democratic Party's Biden in power, this has not changed the US's desire to "decouple" from China, as exemplified by the "chip war" in the preamble; fourth, the COVID±19 new crown epidemic in late 2019 can be seen as the first non-traditional human security "world war" in the sense of Fourth, the COVID±19 new crown epidemic in late 2019, which can be seen as the first non-traditional security "world war" of mankind, objectively became an accelerator of "reverse globalisation", melting down the global industrial chain for a time; Fifth, the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, which focused not on the war itself, but on the post-war sanctions war between the West and Russia, fully revealing the "weaponisation of globalisation". The danger of the "weaponisation of globalisation" has led all countries to reconsider their security in the globalised environment.

Clearly, the world has entered a "post-neoliberal globalisation era".

IV. Projection of the possibility of a "post-neoliberal globalization era

The author believes that globalization is in line with the general historical trend, and although there will be ups and downs and adjustments, the general direction will not change. According to Wallerstein's "world system" theory, we are currently in the trough of the "Kondratieff" long wave, which means that a new round of technological revolution will accompany this major adjustment of globalisation, when the new relations of production will also change with the leap of the new productive forces. It is possible that the game of globalisation between sea power and land power, which has been going on for millennia, will no longer be mutually exclusive.

What changes are likely to occur in the foreseeable future in the "post-neoliberal globalisation era"?

1. Neo-mercantilism replaces neoliberalism. This theoretical shift may be the underlying logic of the current round of globalisation, which is still dominated by the United States. This is marked by Trump's trade war with China in 2018, culminating in the Biden administration's "war on chips" against China, and the sanctions imposed by the US and Europe through the confiscation of Russia's national foreign exchange reserves and the private property of Russians, at the expense of breaking the line of "sanctity of private property". The logic of neo-liberal economic theory, which has been "in force" for over 40 years, is likely to be replaced by neo-mercantilism, i.e. new economic rules under trade bans (equivalent to franchises). The most likely replacement is neo-mercantilism, a new economic rule (equivalent to a franchise) under a trade ban. Until the outcome of the game of the century between the US and China is known, the US will contribute to the intensification of the new mercantilism.

2. Multipolarisation of the world security system and bipolarisation of the world economic system. The era of "post-neoliberal globalisation" will also be accompanied by a "post-liberal hegemonic era" for the US, which will be marked by a contraction of US power worldwide, typically through the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and a reduction in US influence over the Middle East as a whole. Numerous cases have proved that the US can only protect small and medium-sized countries below the size of Japan and Germany in terms of security, while regional powers such as China, Russia, India and Brazil can only choose an independent and autonomous security strategy.

At the same time, the future world will form two economic systems centred on China and the United States respectively, which is called "bipolarity", but unlike the two camps of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the two economic systems of China and the United States will be mutually embedded and interconnected, and there will be no complete separation (the so-called "New Cold War The two economic systems will not be completely separate (the so-called "New Cold War"). With China's "double-cycle" economic strategy, a "three-ring economic sphere" will be formed around China - the first ring being the developed country segment, the second ring being the The first ring will be the developed countries segment, the second the developing countries segment and the third the Chinese internal circulation segment.

3. The monocentric globalisation structure will change into a globalisation framework with multiple interlocking blocks. According to the theoretical model of the "world system", China is likely to emerge as another economic pole in the globalisation structure with the wind of the new technological revolution, while neo-mercantilism dictates that the most likely alternative model after the ebb of "neoliberal globalisation" is "The role of regional economic integration organisations such as the EU, RCEP, ASEAN, LAC and NAFTA will become more prominent, but it should be noted that the framework of the last round of globalisation (IMF, World Bank, WTO) still exists and is intertwined with the regional integration blocks.

4. The monetary system may emerge as a triad of the US dollar, the euro and the RMB. With the US national debt currently topping US$31 trillion, the creditworthiness of the US dollar is being significantly eroded. The question that deserves more thought is whether the post-Bretton Woods era, with its constant and indiscriminate issuance of unanchored dollars, is still in the interest of other world system participants. And what are the reliable alternatives in the "post-debt dollar" era? In the author's view, the most likely alternative is an offensive and defensive alliance between the RMB and the Euro under the framework of a "digital sovereign currency", such as a huge currency swap agreement, so that the international currency basket will be a triad of the US dollar, the Euro and the RMB.

5. Equalisation of land and sea rights around the "New World Island". With China's world-leading infrastructure construction technologies, such as high-speed rail, ships, airports, nuclear power and extra-high voltage, it is likely that the next wave of globalisation will somewhat smooth out the uneven development of sea and land caused by the last round of neo-liberal globalisation, creating a new situation where both sea and land are at the same time, which is also the core of China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative - infrastructure connectivity. This is the core of China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative - infrastructure connectivity, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which in the future will extend to Iran, Afghanistan and five Central Asian countries, connecting landlocked countries to large ports through high-speed railways, thus promoting inland development. The so-called "New World Island" is a new geo-imagination with Eurasia at its core, encompassing Southeast Asia, Australia, Africa and the Arctic shipping lanes.

6. From the "democratisation of international relations" to the "democratisation of world civilisation". In his keynote speech at the 19th National Congress in 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed "respect for the diversity of world civilisations", and in October 2017, "building a community of human destiny" was written into the Constitution of the Communist Party of China. In October 2017, "building a community of human destiny" was written into the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, and in the preamble of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China when it was revised in 2018. Clearly, this is the opposite of the "universal values" of a single civilisation advocated by the United States. The trend of the new globalisation should be to avoid the "clash of civilisations", emphasise the "symbiosis of civilisations" and evolve from the "democratisation of international relations" to the "democratisation of world civilisations". Democratisation of world civilisations".