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Munich Security Report 2023 - Content Brief and Core Insights by Chapter

Original link: https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2023/ 

Full text download: https://d3mbhodo1l6ikf.cloudfront.net/2023/Munich%20Security%20Report%202023/MunichSecurityReport2023_Re_vision.pdf 

(The following is a translation of the original text and does not represent the views of this platform)

C1 Introduction

Core view

Russia's war against Ukraine is not only a human tragedy for the Ukrainian people. It also shows that even the key principles of the international order are under attack by authoritarian revisionists.

Russia and China promote a version of the international order in which the interests of authoritarian leaders take precedence over the values of liberal democracy. Liberal democracies are slowly awakening to the challenge.

Defenders of the liberal vision can effectively fight back if they recognise the fundamental nature of the revisionist challenge and quickly reinvigorate their own vision of the ideal international order.

To succeed, these defenders need to do more than nurture a global coalition of liberal democracies. They must also build a larger coalition willing to actively defend the key principles of the liberal order. This requires due respect for the legitimate grievances of many countries in the "global South" against the existing order. Merely defending the status quo will not do. They need to reconceptualise it.

C2 Human Rights

Core view

More than 70 years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights are not only in a tragic state in many parts of the world, but the very concept of human rights as a universal aspiration is also contested.

Beijing has replaced its defensive behaviour with a more assertive approach to human rights. It is denouncing the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as Western; instead, it is promoting an alternative vision of human rights governance.

Emboldened dictators are not the only challenge. The idea of unfreedom, fuelled by right-wing nationalist movements, is now deeply entrenched in democratic societies themselves. Democracies in different parts of the world often disagree on international human rights norms and mechanisms.

Efforts to restore the spirit of universality that originally inspired the human rights project face serious resistance as systemic competition will widen, rather than narrow, existing differences between governments. But protests in Iran and elsewhere have also shown that human rights have not lost their global appeal among the people.

C3 Infrastructure

Core view

Global infrastructures have become major sites of systemic competition because they promise to generate structural power: the power to set the rules of the game and create dependencies.

The global trade infrastructure based on WTO rules is being eroded as China, the US, India and even its staunch defender, the EU, increasingly resort to protectionism. The old rules are dying, but there is no new vision in sight.

Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has engaged in large-scale physical infrastructure projects in developing countries to create a China-centred regional order. The G7 has only recently responded by launching its own infrastructure fund.

Democracies and autocracies are competing to shape the actual promoters and principles of the emerging digital infrastructure. But the US and the EU are only slowly converging on their digital visions.

C4 development cooperation: the strings attached

"Despite the fact that China has become a prominent development partner for African countries, the Afrobarometer poll results surprisingly show that the Chinese development model has not yet won the hearts and minds of African citizens. citizens of 34 African countries surveyed between 2019 and 2021 still see the US development model as more positive than the Chinese model. However, they view the European model much less favourably, despite its similarities to the US, reflecting the widespread perception that European countries have still not fully confronted their colonial past. European development efforts have also gone largely unnoticed in comparison to the more visible Chinese initiatives, despite the fact that European countries and EU institutions have invested heavily in development. The US remains the largest donor, spending US$35 billion in 2020, but is closely followed by Germany (US$29 billion), EU institutions (US$21 billion) and the UK (US$19 billion). China's share of foreign aid, comparable to the ODA pursued by the US and Europe, is only about US$5.4 billion in the same year."

C5 Energy security: replenishing fuel

Core view

Moscow's weaponisation of energy has shattered the perception of Russia as a reliable energy partner and exposed Europe's over-reliance on Russian fossil fuels. The ripple effects extend far beyond European markets, ushering in a global energy crisis.

As the severed energy relationship between Europe and Russia is unlikely to be repaired, there will be a major reshuffling of fossil fuel trade flows, increasingly reflecting geopolitical fault lines rather than market logic.

The securitisation of energy will extend to green markets. The shift to renewables is accompanied by new vulnerabilities, and dependence on Beijing is central to the concerns of liberal democracies as China dominates the clean energy supply chain. Green technology is key to future prosperity and it will become a major component of the geopolitical competition between China and the US and its partners.

The growing alignment of security, climate and economic goals may be a boon to the climate agenda. However, a more politicised and fragmented market has its own risks for energy security and the transition to net zero emissions.

C6 Nuclear order

Core view

The nuclear order is coming under increasing pressure. As nuclear arms control regimes continue to erode, fewer safeguards are in place to prevent an arms race and further nuclear proliferation.

The continuing Russian nuclear threat and reckless attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power facilities pose a serious threat to the nuclear order. Since the Cold War, a nuclear attack in Europe has never been more realistic than it is today.

As its nuclear arsenal continues to grow, China could soon become the third nuclear superpower, joining the United States and Russia. Consequently, the nuclear arms control regime needs to be extended, but China has so far refused to accept restrictions.

With increased great power competition, rising geopolitical tensions and growing dissatisfaction in the 'global South' with the NPT-based order, it is challenging to reshape a nuclear order that ensures nuclear stability, promotes transparency and arms control and enjoys broad global support. Nevertheless, the international community must do its utmost to achieve this goal.